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Challenges and Tactics of Private Security 
Guards in the Fragmented City
Jean-Baptiste Lanne
Translated by Sadie J. Mobley
In 2016, private security services made up the largest sector of Kenya’s 
salaried labor force. In 2015–2016, this fast-growing market generated an 
average of 265 million EUR in annual turnover and employed 300,000 to 
350,000 workers in 2018.1 Roughly 70% of these workers are concentrated 
in Nairobi. Beyond statistics, the importance of the private security market 
in Kenya’s capital city stands out immediately in the urban landscape. 
For locals, seeing an askari—originally meaning “soldier” in Swahili—
opening doors and checking visitors at the gates of private compounds 
or shopping malls is an everyday experience. For an outside observer, the 
direct experience of military urbanism (high walls, barbed wire, electronic 
locks, and cameras) gives the impression of encountering an “anxious city” 
(Bernard & Segaud 2011).
Yet, the scope of urban threats remains difficult to grasp. Police reports 
are the only documents available to map out a statistical portrait of crime 
in Nairobi, though they are highly unreliable. On the one hand, many 
residents choose not to report crimes because of widespread mistrust of 
the police. On the other, statistics are limited to “cases” filtered by the 
administration and exclude minor offenses and situations involving police 
misconduct (Ruteere, Mutahi, Mitchell et al. 2013). Empirical evidence 
identifies four main types of fear emanating from different social groups: 
fear of “the poor,” generally associated with juvenile delinquency; mass 
political violence, such as riots, lynching and murders; police violence; 
and terrorism, pervasive for over twenty years and which the attacks of 
Westgate (2013) and Garissa (2015) revived.2
1. Source: Kenya Security Industry Association (2018). The lack of market 
regulation explains the inaccuracy of statistics. 
2. Kenya was hit by a series of attacks claimed by the al-Shabaab Islamist group 
in response to Kenya's military action in southern Somalia. Two large-scale 
attacks were especially traumatic: the attack on the upscale shopping centre 
“Westgate” in Nairobi on 24 September 2013, and another at the University 
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Faced with these difficulties, it seems necessary to move beyond questions 
about effectiveness of security systems. Relying on a recent epistemological 
renewal,3 this chapter proposes to diverge from Frédéric Gros’ objectivist 
definition of security as “an objective situation characterised by the absence 
of danger” (Gros 2012, 74), and rather open onto a more performative 
approach. Security, then, refers to a performance whose main objective is 
to stimulate, guide and manage the peace of mind of given population. This 
approach consequently draws the focus to actors who literally embody 
security on the ground: guards posted at the gates of private residences or 
large public facilities. It allows to identify two main axes of research. The 
first one is about examining the strict disciplinary constraints weighing on 
the guards: physical education, inculcation of corporate codes, mandatory 
wearing of the uniform, and GPS tracking of any movement. Over time, 
the guards nevertheless develop tactical routines to evade the constant 
supervision and recreate spaces of freedom. The security performance is 
secondly to be studied as a powerful mechanism of social distinction—
creating a sense of belonging at the heart of residential neighbourhoods, 
that is, a sense of home and community. This last matter has repercussions 
on the ambiguous role held by guards—while they come to protect an 
“inside” (the safe place, the microcosm), they are often, in fact, physically 
and symbolically relegated outside the social space they consecrate.
1. Creating the Immobile Human4
For formal neighbourhoods in Nairobi, there are three prominent types of 
security service supply. The first brings together some thirty national-scale 
(BM Security, Securex, Lavington, Security) or international security firms 
(KK Security, G4S). These are structured by a strong chain of command: 
managers, team officers, supervisors, and senior security guards. These 
companies are in charge of the most critical infrastructures (airports, 
embassies, public buildings, shopping centres) as well as of residences 
in the wealthiest parts of the city. The second type includes around 1900 
“small” companies (50 to 500 employees) allotted to lower infrastructures: 
supermarkets, shops, and service stations, as well as middle class residences. 
These companies are characterised by working methods borrowing 
both from the official register (uniforms, vehicles, acronyms, corporate 
of Garissa in the eastern part of the country on 2 April 2015, carried out in a 
similar manner (terrorist commando storming the building and slaughtering a 
large number of hostages).
3. See especially Schneier (1999), Pain & Smith (2008), and Barnett (2015).
4. “One of our goals is to create immobile human beings… As long as they 
don’t move, nothing can happen. They have to report anything they witness.” 
(Director of operations at Lavington Security Ltd, interview, 9 February 2016).
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headquarters, and registration with the Capital Markets Authority) and 
the informal sector (bribes, absence of employment contracts and social 
contributions). Finally, the third type of supply, by far the largest in terms 
of clients, is made up entirely of individually contracted untrained guards, 
directly hired by owners or owners’ associations. It is the one contracted by 
the vast majority of the middle-class in Nairobi.
When hired, guards are divided into three segments based on two 
criteria: the level of education and physical skills. Men or women who 
can substantiate an “O-level” (12 years of schooling) and meet certain 
size and strength requirements, seek employment with formal or semi-
formal enterprises. Those ones provide them significantly higher salaries 
(~12,000 KES per month, expenses deducted5) and possibly a contribution 
to the national social security fund (NSSF) or health insurance programs 
(NHIF). Workers who do not meet these criteria find a job in the informal 
sector, earning from 6,000 to 8,000  KES per month. Beyond these main 
distinctions, guard profiles are relatively homogeneous. Among the sixty 
guards surveyed, most are newcomers to Nairobi with less than five years 
in the city. Most of them are young, and just starting their family life. The 
lack of economic opportunities in the countryside, combined with rising 
financial needs (dependent children, tuition fees), pushes them to leave 
their home towns to try their luck in Nairobi, often on the advice of a 
relative. When they left, none of them ever imagined becoming an askari. 
Mr Safala,6 a marketing manager for Securex Ltd, is conscious of the low 
motivation of his employees: “You don’t grow up wishing to become a 
security guard. In Kenya, mothers tell to their children: if you don’t work 
hard enough, you will finish like those askaris!” (interview 6. April 2016).
In the formal sector, training askaris is an attempt to compensate for 
the lack of prestige in the profession. The issue is twofold: avoiding early 
demotivation, while instilling guards with enough morale to faithfully 
showcase corporate values. This strategy is characteristic of an “emotional 
labour”7 where emotions expressed by workers, especially through their 
body language, are an integral part of the professional performance. 
Every day at his post, the security guard must visibly express values of 
seriousness, commitment, courtesy, prestige and professionalism. By doing 
so, he contributes in augmenting the standing of the place. In practice, 
5.  The figures given are averages, because of the great variability of wages, 
especially in the informal sector. Government recommendations as of June 26, 
2015 are respectively 10,954 KES per month and 12,221 KES per month for day 
and night guards Source: Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 91: 587. 
6. Names have been changed to protect anonymity.
7. On the notion of “emotional labour,” see Leidner (1999), Mac Dowell (2009), 
and Wharton (2009). 
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training remains short: they last from a week to a month depending on 
the company. It basically consists of two main components: physical 
training and an introduction to public relations. The physical component 
closely resembles paramilitary training; new recruits learn how to march 
in formation and perform a proper salute (arm along the body, joined 
ankles, military salute). The development of physical discipline is a core 
exercise, even more than the teaching of basic defense techniques. Purely 
protective performance is relegated to the background. As Nandini Gooptu 
(2013) points out in her study of urban sentinels in India, “public relation” 
training allows one to learn the full lexicon of subordination. In class, new 
recruits are taught how to use expressions such as “Good morning, sir/
madam, how can I help you? What can I do for you today?,” “Yes, sir,” and 
“Yes, madam.” They must ask clients how they wish to be addressed in 
order to satisfy their needs. Although rarely put into practice, the military 
salute is theoretically required. Finally, communication techniques are 
taught in order to mitigate and resolve conflicts. Faced with a belligerent 
or aggressive client, the guard must remain firm yet calm. Guards must 
not challenge clients, but should rather intensify expressions of politeness: 
“Sir, I understand your point, but…,” “This is not in my power to allow you 
to…” As the tone rises, guards are advised not to take initiative, and to leave 
management of the incident to the proper chain of command.
According to a manager, the main purpose of training is to create 
“immobile human beings.” This control over bodies and attitudes requires 
a two-fold immobility from the askari: a physical one, first—being able to 
stand for hours at the gate of compounds; a social one, then—i.e. agreeing 
to stay at his/her place, a social notch below the residents.
2. What Security for Those who Secure?
Holding a Job Somewhere…
After training, security guards are assigned to a position. Those from 
the informal sector usually work in their employer’s home. In the two 
survey districts, Kileleshwa (Nairobi West) and Buruburu (Nairobi East), 
guards express recurrent concerns Workdays are long (12-hour shifts 
starting or ending from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M.) and often described as boring 
due to the monotonous nature of the work: opening and closing the door 
for incoming or outgoing vehicles. Hunger is also frequently mentioned. 
Most of the guards have tea in the morning, eating only once a day for 
dinner. Eating during a shift is indeed difficult, as cooking at the workplace 
is mostly prohibited (“it makes the place dirty,” a tenant of Kileleshwa says). 
Respondents also evoke physical suffering: standing fatigue, headache-
inducing heat, sickness brought on by the rain and cold, or mosquito bites 
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in the evening or early morning. More specific to night watchmen, feelings 
of loneliness and fear characterise the watching experience. More, the 
interactions with customers seem to be at the heart of the work’s difficulty. 
For residents or customers, guards may even appear as daily obstacles. 
Customers have an array of names at their disposal, depending on whether 
they want to be polite or rude. "Soldier!” and “Askari!” are relatively 
benevolent terms, while “Watchman”! (referring to the passive function of 
one who only watches), or “Maasai!” (locally and professionally perceived 
as “primitive” in popular representations) are intentionally humiliating. 
If an incident upsets a passer-by, he or she can play on the register of 
social distinction, putting the guardian back in his (lower) place: “You are 
useless!,” “Open the gate, stupid!,” or “You are so primitive!” Such verbal 
abuse contributes to weaken the guards’ psychological condition, as most 
of them felt reached in their dignity. Nelson A., 31, working in a residence 
in Kileleshwa, describes this interiorised condition: “I open your gate, I wait 
at your gate… I’m waiting for you like your dog…!” (Interview 11 February 
2016). Alfred G., 46, guard in a Kileleshwa compound, explicitly recognises 
the process of alienation that he is undergoing:
[>Interviewer]: And are you ready if someone attacks you?
[>Alfred]: Yeah. I’m ready because we still have the material. We are just 
trained to use the material…
[>Int.]: What kind of material are you talking about?
[>Alfred]: Material… I have this one [he shows me his baton], and then myself.
[>Int.]: And then yourself?
[>Alfred]: Mmhhh. I just leave myself to you.
(Interview 3 February 2016.)
Alfred’s words seem to rehearse the rhetoric assimilated during training. 
The technical term “material” he uses to refer to his own body is quite 
significant in that sense. Likewise, the expressed value of total commitment 
to the customers (“I just leave myself to you”), mirroring the idea of sacrifice 
in the army, is typical of ideological conditioning. Thus, fear, loneliness, 
poor self-esteem and a feeling of alienation all by turns create a sense of 
identity and psychological insecurity among the guards.
… and Being Absent Elsewhere
Guards assignments to a fixed position for a dozen hours a day directly 
explain their weak integration in their neighbourhoods. In a vast majority, 
they live in informal settlements in Nairobi—the only urban areas where 
rents are available—but work in better-off neighbourhoods. For example, 
guards working in Kileleshwa usually live in Kawangware, Kibera, or 
Kangemi, all slums in the western part of the city. Guards in Buruburu 
reside in the slums east of the city, like Mathare, Kiambui, Korogocho, or 
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Dandora. In these neighbourhoods, self-preservation is rooted in profound 
and sustained social interactions.8 Safety is built daily through nods and 
greetings in passing, offering a cigarette, advancing a small sum of money, in 
short, maintaining good neighbourhood relations. These relationships may 
be useful in case of harm (theft, assault, landlord litigation, etc.), especially 
in urban areas where police intervention is often perceived as ineffective. 
As newcomers to the city, guards do not benefit from this social capital and 
struggle to build it. Leaving at 5 A.M. and returning at nearly 7 P.M., they 
live as strangers in their own places of residence. During interviews, many 
mention that they do not trust their neighbours. Some fear that because of 
their daily absences, their landlords will rent their place to other tenants. 
Others describe the lack of material investment in their place for fear of 
being stolen during the day. The inside is then reduced to bare necessity 
(no TV or even radio). Josphat M., 25, a guard in Kileleshwa and resident 
of Kawangware, talks about his daily absence that makes him a potential 
target for neighbourhood youth: “When you are not around… obviously 
they know that you have gone searching for money. So, when you come 
back… they look at you in a certain way… they think that you are making 
a lot. When you are not around, and they know you are going for work… 
they know you are making [money]… the more you are lost, the more you 
are making [money]… So, you have to look for your security very well” 
(Interview, 15 February 2016).
The perceived dangers are not limited to the neighbourhood. From a 
sample of 57 guards surveyed, 32 admit being victims of assault on their 
way to work, most often for racketeering purposes. Certain factors increase 
the odds. The first concerns the times of the trips: around 5  A.M. and 
around 7 P.M. for day guards. These times are higher risk because of the 
darkness (the night guards are a little favoured because they start at 5 P.M. 
and return at 7  A.M.). Another factor is the route used for commuting: 
at least part of the trip is made through the slums on unlit roads. Guards 
newly-arrived in the city have little knowledge of the hotspots for danger 
and sometimes unknowingly take routes known for frequent muggings 
(e.g. Jamhuri estate when leaving Kibera, or Dandora Bridge, on the path to 
Dandora). Finally, the regularity of the commute constitutes an additional 
risk factor. Adding to the racket, the potentiality of police aggression is real 
(brutal interrogation, threats, arrest). A lone man,9 walking from or to a 
slum at an early or late hour, is automatically suspect. The guards, among 
others, are the first victims of the criminalisation of the poor in Nairobi. 
One might ask why the guardians do not simply wear their uniforms in 
8. These findings come from a multi-month ethnographic work in Kibera, a 
large slum in Nairobi West, conducted between February 2015 and April 2017.
9. The guards surveyed did not report any such police aggression.
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transit. Yet the same attire that might protect them from police violence, 
makes them a walking target to youth gangs in the slum.
Could these workers, subjected daily to uncertain and harmful conditions, 
then be described as an “urban precariat” (Standing 2011)? Guy Standing’s 
theoretical effort to define a new category of workers—neo-victims of the 
neoliberal city—seems partly relevant, provided that the term “precariat” 
is not necessarily to be understood in terms of “class.” Standing defines 
precariat as a social group characterised by its vulnerability to multiple 
uncertainties: job-insecurity due to the interchangeable nature of the 
worker (without bringing valued skills to the table); social insecurity in 
the absence of trade unions and social protection systems; uncertainty of 
times and places of work in the name of flexible economic activity; and 
finally representational insecurity, as dispersed workers have no place for a 
collective voice to emerge. In the cities of the Global North, representations 
of the precariat are increasingly embodied by deliverymen, janitors, 
maintenance workers, and dry cleaners. It is important to remember that 
such a precariat also exists in Global South cities, operating through the 
same mechanisms of subjection. In Nairobi, the guards also undergo a form 
of poly-insecurity, visible at several levels: physical, psychological, social, 
relational and political.
3. Living in the Place of the Other:  
What Tactics for which Lifestyle?
Askaris carry many burdens every day. Those are mostly due to the fact that 
guards actually live in the place of the other. This last expression describes 
a generally enclosed place where a person or a group of persons (a tenant, 
a group of tenants, or a chain of command) have the power to impose their 
own life rules. As a result, guards are daily subjected to a series of small 
injunctions specific to their workplace (and life): being told how to stand, 
what one has the right to do or not do, with whom one has the right to interact, 
how objects should be arranged, and for what uses, etc. This emblematic 
type of place finds local variations in Nairobi: the “compound” (enclosed 
luxury buildings divided in apartments) in wealthy areas like Kileleshwa, 
Kilimani or Lavington; the “court” (small single houses distributed around a 
privatised street) in the middle-class neighbourhoods of Buruburu, Ngumo, 
or South C. These places are by definition familial, leading to a blurring of 
family and professional relationships, as Staci Strobl illustrated through 
the example of housemaids in Bahrain (Strobl 2009). Domestic workers are 
kept in an indistinct status oscillating between temporary family-members 
(they are given presents for Christmas for example, or second-hand clothes 
for their kids) and fundamentally undesirable figures (outsiders coming 
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to disturb the family’s privacy). Their work is desired, and yet, they must 
know how to become invisible when the situation requires it. Faced with 
this ambiguity, the guards develop “tactical” behaviours (Certeau 1991, 
46) consisting of trickery, playing with conventions, diverting the uses of 
micro-places and objects to pursue their own interests. In this very specific 
case, a comparison between Kileleshwa’s compounds and Buruburu’s 
courts makes it possible to grasp the importance of spatial configuration in 
the development of individualised tactics.
In Kileleshwa, Number as Resource
In Kileleshwa, a wealthy neighbourhood west of Nairobi, residential 
buildings are mostly composed by private compounds. The specific type 
of housing consists of several buildings divided into apartments, usually 
organised around a car park and often equipped with shared facilities 
(gardens, games for children, gym, swimming pool) depending on the 
standing. It is usually surrounded by a wall, most often equipped with an 
electric fence. Several characteristics emerge here. Firstly, the compound 
is inhabited by wealthy populations, who typically employ domestic 
staff. Secondly, the habitat density—due to the apartment complex style—
explains the daily proximity of employees. Guards, caretakers, gardeners, 
garbage collectors and domestic helpers all work together in a relatively 
small space. Finally, residents most often rely on private security firms 
from the formal sector. Such firms exercise strict control over the guards—
particularly regarding safety protocols—via supervisors or team officers 
on motorcycles. For the most secure compounds, high technology further 
reinforces this control (real-time geolocation of guards, push buttons to 
operate at regular intervals, etc.).
In this context, can guards find some spaces of freedom? The number of 
people working in the compound, combined with the limited space, creates 
the conditions for a community of mutual aid. It is common, for example, 
for domestic helpers to bring leftovers from the family dinner to the askaris 
quarters. Gardeners share the fruits they have harvested in the gardens. 
In hotels, launderers run laundry for everyone. As for the guards, they are 
deliberately less careful about the entry and exit of domestic helpers during 
the day. This community of workers does not end, however, with a series 
of good deed exchanges. It branches out to provide psychological support 
as well—especially when facing domestic violence—but also through 
the simple pleasure of social gathering. The spatial configuration of the 
compound makes it all possible. With a number of hidden spaces, workers 
can find respite from tenants’ constant surveillance. Staircases, flat roofs 
where laundry is suspended, car parks, swimming-pool areas: all these 
spaces, relatively quiet at certain times of the day, become interstitial life 
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places where people converse, exchange tips, eat together, or braid hair. Day 
by day, the development of such sociability can be directly understood in 
regards to the workers’ difficulties in producing social cohesion in their 
places of residence. Kept away from their neighbourhoods during the day, 
they recreate neighbourly relationships (mutual favours, daily conversations, 
invitation to their respective “corners”10) in adapting to the monitoring 
and local constraints. Finally, contracting with a formal security company 
seemingly produces, a certain disempowerment of tenants vis-à-vis the 
security protocol. As the company’s supervisors take care of discipline, it is 
not up to tenants to worry about the behaviour of any particular askari. As 
a result, some tenants are more lenient with the small economic businesses 
of the guards: newspaper sales, car washes, small commissions at the 
neighbouring store, etc. As they benefit these extra services for themselves, 
they even defend, if necessary, their employees against the managers.
In Buruburu, Fluidity of Spaces… and Social Positions
In Buruburu, a middle-class residential neighbourhood east of Nairobi, the 
socio-spatial structure of the environment offers varied possibilities. The 
general neighbourhood consists of five estates built successively from the 
1960s (Phase I to Phase V), with each subdivided into “courts.” A court is 
a group of small houses distributed around a cul-de-sac street, enclosed 
by a gate. The airy setting, detached houses with gardens, semi-private 
streets and the location a retreat from the hustle and bustle of the city 
centre make it an ideal place for family life. The population is mainly 
composed of civil servants, business workers, and employees—forming a 
much wealthier fringe than that of the surrounding neighbourhoods like in 
Umoja, Kariobangi, Kayole, or Jericho.
Buruburu’s singular space can be understood as a “continuum of 
publicity” (Staeheli & Mitchell 2008). In other words, there is a gradient 
of publicity from the domestic space to the main street, understood as the 
centre of public life (commercial activities, bars, lively animation, traffic). 
Between these two poles fit at least two spaces representing varying 
degrees of enclosure. The common areas of the court, enclosed by a gate, 
come just after the domestic space: they constitute a relatively private 
space shared between neighbours, where children are free to play. Beyond 
this space, intermediate streets connecting several courts to the main street 
10. While doing my observations, I noticed that domestic workers tend to create 
a place of their own within the compound: a partially limited or withdrawn 
place, equipped with a few personal belongings, generally corresponding with 
their different workstations (sentry box, garden, swimming pool facilities, 
stairwells, rooftop terraces for the cleaning staff). This is how they are able to 
receive visitors and develop a neighbourhood social life.
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are vitalised by some shops. If these streets are not closed in the literal 
sense of the term, they remain a semi-exclusive space, insofar as they only 
give access to private spaces. This continuum of spaces allows a more fluid 
mobility for the guards. It is not uncommon for instance to see a Buruburu 
askari leaving his court to talk with a colleague across the way, or to buy a 
soda at the small grocery on the street. The either public or private character 
of the streets is ambiguous enough to offer the guards a certain flexibility 
in their movements. Following the same logic, the gate of the court does 
not need to be systematically closed, which allows the askari to be absent 
for a short period of time.
Buruburu guards mostly come from the informal sector. They are 
individually recruited by the association of residents managing the court. 
As a result, the compliance with the security protocol is far much looser. 
Guards have no training, little to no equipment, few wear uniforms, and 
they do not fall under the supervision of a team officer. To some extent, 
this increases their flexibility. An observation in the neighbourhood 
confirms it. At Buruburu Phase II, two courts face each other: Fatia Court 
and Lomilio Court. In March 2016, while finishing an interview with Paul 
S., a Fatia Court guard, one of the guards from Lomilio, Jackson, came to 
interrupt our conversation. Jackson was employed by a formal company, 
247 Security Ltd, unlike Paul. Two years before indeed, the inhabitants of 
Lomilio Court preferred to use the services of a formal security company 
following cases of vandalism within the court. Jackson came to Paul to 
propose him an agreement: if the latter agreed to come to Lomilio Court 
to wash resident cars, they would share the profits. Jackson could not do it 
himself, because his uniform forbid him. The inhabitants of Lomilio Court, 
in opting for a formal company, put a subsequent end to the guard’s poly-
activity. At Lomilio Court, they had to focus exclusively on surveillance. 
But the relative mobility of Jackson allowed him to outsource his extra 
work to Paul—a guard without uniform and foreign to the court, who 
would discretely do the job. This example is representative of the different 
tactics at work in Buruburu. Guards can play on their visibilities (uniforms 
or absence of uniforms), on their worker status (informal guards or formal 
guards controlled by team officers), as well as on their differentiated 
mobility, linked to the relative fluidity between different closed spaces.
Conclusion
In Nairobi, the security performance is not to be only understood as a response 
to identified threats. It is also, and perhaps even above all, a powerful force for 
social distinction. Contracting with a security company is a sign of standing, 
both for real estate developers and residents. Socioeconomic hierarchies 
are explicitly displayed through the type of security services contracted: 
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international companies using high technologies for the wealthiest; local, 
sometimes semi-formal enterprises for the upper and middle classes; askari 
recruited informally for the small middle class; and protection by youth 
groups for the poorest populations.11 This literally distinctive value, in 
Bourdieu’s sense of the term “distinction,” does not only apply to spaces 
and social groups that employ security services. It logically leads to the 
subjection of security workers themselves, and in particular the guards. The 
security performance can be read as a system of representations in which 
the guard is, in a way, reduced to the role of a stooge. For the tenant, he—like 
all domestic staff—is presented as the subordinate, the inferior, the one who 
lacks education and whose ways (of speaking, standing, working) call back 
to a certain “primitiveness” (this term often comes up in interviews). For the 
visitor, for the customer of the mall, he must rather be a living marker of 
the prestige of the place. The cleanliness of the uniform, the politeness, the 
qualities of communication, as well as a quasi-mechanical compliancy in the 
exercise of the protocol are determinants in the construction of a standing. 
Therein lies an observable paradox of the everyday security performance: 
the material and symbolic construction of a peer group leads to the creation 
of a “zone of indistinctness” (Agamben 1997, 46) at its margins—a space that 
lets neither inside nor outside those who, by their own bodies, contribute to 
secure the community.
Finally, guards are assigned to places—gates, parking lots, entrances 
areas of shopping malls—that they do not choose, and from which they 
can be removed at any time. These places are generally located far from 
their place of residence, out of their fields of action, and inserted into social 
configurations offering them few opportunities to develop a professional 
sociability. As a result, some form of social immobility is added to spatial 
immobility. A current representation of social achievement in urban areas is 
based on the mobility of the individual: to be able to move, to go to work by 
car, to access various leisure areas, to leave for the weekend on holidays, etc. 
In Nairobi, in order for a small – and certainly growing – number to safely 
access such mobility, a large number finds itself consequently immobilised, 
assigned to a place or moved arbitrarily. This last remark makes it possible, in 
essence, to turn away from an objectivist conception of security. Observing 
the daily challenges and tactics of guards in Nairobi shows that the goal of 
security—if there is one—is never so much oriented towards a person or 
a property, but rather towards a “social arrangement”(Dalby 1997, 9): the 
collective acceptance of a given situation to the detriment of another.
11. Security mechanisms in Nairobi’s slums are not covered in this chapter, 
which focuses exclusively on the figure of the askari posted at the entrance of 
privatised spaces. Security in slum is nevertheless very subtly organised. For an 
overview, see Rodriguez-Torres (2014).
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